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Cambridge social ontology:  
an interview with Tony Lawson  
 
TONY LAWSON (born in Minehead, UK) is a trained mathematician 
located in the Faculty of Economics at Cambridge University. His work 
spreads over various fields, but it focuses primarily in the philosophy of 
social sciences, in particular: social ontology. Amongst his publications 
are the Routledge monographs Economics and reality (1997) and 
Reorienting economics (2003). Numerous journal symposia and 
publications by others have been devoted to his work, most recently 
Edward Fullbrook’s Ontology and economics: Tony Lawson and his critics 
(2009). 
Lawson’s various activities over the last twenty five years include 
founding and chairing the Cambridge Realist Workshop and the 
Cambridge Social Ontology Group and serving as the director of the 
Cambridge Centre for Gender Studies. He is an editor of the Cambridge 
Journal of Economics and a member and trustee of the associated 
Cambridge Political Economy Society. Outside Cambridge, Lawson is a 
joint founder of the European Association for Evolutionary Political 
Economy and a founding member and trustee of the Centre for Critical 
Realism. He also is the primary instigator of the International 
Association for Critical Realism. He sits on the editorial boards of 
numerous international journals including Feminist Economics. 
EJPE is very pleased to present this interview with Tony Lawson in 
which he discusses his work on various issues including social ontology 
and critical realism in economics, along with the differences that he 
perceives between his position and those of Uskali Mäki and Nancy 
Cartwright. We had the opportunity to sit down and talk with Lawson 
about all theses issues following his presentation this past spring at the 
research seminar series at the Erasmus Institute for Philosophy and 
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EJPE: Perhaps you can begin by providing us with some background. 
As far as we know, you are a mathematician by training. How did you 
become interested in philosophical issues regarding economics, and in 
realism in particular?  
 
TONY LAWSON: Yes, you are right; my training is mathematics, pure 
mathematics. The intermediate step was politics, student politics. I 
became involved in student politics in London. I became quite active. 
But I found the jargon of economists a barrier to constructive 
discussion. So instead of taking up a PhD place in mathematics as I had 
intended, I pursued economics at the graduate level. 
Once in an economics faculty—I studied for a Master’s degree at the 
LSE—I was immediately struck by the use of formalistic models which 
seemed to me to be very silly. These models were advanced, then as 
now, by people who, I think it is fair to say, are rather pedestrian in their 
approach to, and often very poor at, mathematics, though seemingly in 
awe of it, or perhaps in awe of mathematicians. 
I asked numerous economists: why are you pursuing formalism if 
doing so seems to force you to resort to making all these irrelevant 
assumptions? What is the point? What is the value of it all? The only 
reasonable response I received was that it was hoped that the models 
would improve with time. Economists then, as now, seemed to be mostly 
unaware that there are limits to the uses of any specific form of 
mathematics. It was at this point, in effect, that I started to become 
interested in ontology, though I did not know the term. But I became 
very aware of the gap that often existed between the world-view 
presupposed by the methods used, and our best accounts of, or 
certainly my own intuitions about, the nature of social reality. 
I moved on to Cambridge to study for a PhD. This was the mid-
1970s. Here I discussed these sorts of issues with fellow research 
students in particular. I remember that my concerns about the 
irrelevance of formalistic methods were met at one point by the 
assertion that contemporary thinking reveals that all methods fail to 
facilitate insight into social reality anyway. So formalism was on par 
with all other methods. I was then encouraged to read more 
Wittgenstein and ‘up-to-date’ post-modernist philosophy. 
In the course of these discussions I came to recognise that the 
position I held was that of a philosophical realist. I was never convinced 
that I should give up on the idea that there is a world out there and that 
we do get to know it under some descriptions. I decided to spend a year 
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or so trying to work out whether the orientation I adopted really was so 
old fashioned, and whether that mattered. I wanted to explore the 
limitations of my intuitions. As I say, I was not convinced by any 
argument I found against realism. But a process that I had anticipated 
constituting a one-year project turned out to be an aspect of my 
activities that lasted for the rest of my life—so far. 
 
Was this around the time you came across Roy Bhaskar’s work? 
 
No, not at all. That came many years later. I produced stuff criticising 
economics from an explicitly realist perspective for ten years or so 
before coming across Roy. At some point, I discovered that a number of 
us were making similar or anyway related critiques of current social 
scientific practice, but situated in different disciplines. Margaret Archer 
was doing it in sociology; Andrew Sayer in human geography, and so on. 
Roy was doing a similar thing in philosophy and had the philosophical 
language. Eventually, we all sort of came together picking up especially 
on Bhaskar’s philosophical language—and the rest of his contribution, 
of course.  
 
Before discovering Bhaskar’s realism, which account of realism were 
you most drawn to? 
 
I don’t know. I didn’t really know where I was headed. I just read anyone 
and everyone. I read quite a bit of Aristotle, Marx, Hegel, Kant, Hume, 
Whitehead—and many others. I also read people like Bas van Fraassen. I 
remember trying to make sense of his version of realism as an aid to 
finding the most charitable interpretation I could of what 
econometricians were doing. Ultimately, though, I found I had to provide 
my own.  
My concern has long been ontological realism. But I did not get to 
ontology by way of reading texts on ontology or philosophical realism. 
Without using the category, I was focusing on ontological issues from 
very early on. As I said, when I first came into economics at the LSE, my 
basic concern was that the methods we were taught presupposed a 
world of a sort very different to the one in which we actually seem to 
live. I was asking why aren’t we looking at the nature of the phenomena 
to begin with, or anyway at some stage in the analytical process, and I 
was questioning whether our methods are appropriate to the sort of 
reality being addressed. In that sense ontology was always my concern. 
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You are commonly perceived as a ‘critical realist’—by many, as the 
leading critical realist in economics. However, in your talk yesterday 
it was surprising to hear that you seem to be distancing yourself from 
critical realism. Is this perception correct? 
 
No, I do not at all distance myself from critical realism. What I stress is 
that my primary concern is ontology, a form of study, not any set of 
results. Critical realism, if always evolving, remains the best self-
consciously ontological account or theory of which I am aware, but my 
primary interest is ontology itself, the study of the structure of the 
nature of reality. If you were to convince me that critical realism, or an 
aspect of it, is critically flawed, and showed me something more 
sustainable, I would be very happy about it. It is not specific results that 
matter to me as much as relevance. And of specific relevance to social 
understanding at this point, I remain convinced, is ontology. My project 
is characterised by a turn to ontology in social theory as an explicit 
undertaking. This is what I have been doing since the late 1970s. 
So I am actually very happy to be perceived as a critical realist. It is 
not at all a misinterpretation. But it is important to see this project as 
multifaceted and continuously evolving. And it is also variously 
interpreted. You mentioned critical realism in terms of economics, but 
critical realism has now taken on so many forms in so many disciplines. 
The emphasis and presentation vary depending on where you go. So 
incidentally does its reception. Critical realism in some disciplines, say 
in human geography, is almost mainstream. It is big too in sociology and 
critical management studies.  
I am lucky enough to be invited to give talks to groups in various 
disciplines and communities, and in some places I am treated like this is 
where it is all happening; in other places though I am treated like I am 
doing something really subversive. Of course, given the dire state of 
modern economics subversion here is indeed the goal. Some like to 
represent critical realism as comprising various different turns: the 
dialectical turn, the spiritual turn, and so on. I do not find this especially 
helpful. The point though is that the more that this variety occurs, and 
the more my own thinking evolves, the more I find that clarity is best 
served by elaborating precisely what I am saying at any given point 
rather than arguing that the results achieved are part of critical realism. 
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You emphasise that your main concern is ontology as a form of study. 
How do you see the relationship between ontology and methodology 
in economics, broadly speaking? 
 
Of course it depends on what we mean by methodology. If you mean the 
study of methods, all methods have their ontological presuppositions. 
So it is possible to examine the methods of economists and others, and 
a lot of my time has been spent doing that, to uncover the kind, I 
emphasise ‘kind’, of reality they are in effect presupposing. 
If instead we elaborate a general social ontology, an account of social 
reality—should that be possible—this can inform substantive theory and 
choice of method. But it does not directly support any specific theory or 
method. To go from ontology to theory or method requires additional 
empirical assessments. Any two people agreeing on a particular 
ontological conception can differ in their additional empirical claims. 
But ontological insight helps avoid inappropriate reductionist stances 
and aids explanatory and ethical work. This is a very long story.1 
 
Does the use of a hammer presuppose a nail? I do not know if all 
methods presuppose a strict ontology. 
 
That is right, they do not. That is why I emphasise the kind of reality 
presupposed by given methods, and the like. The hammer does not 
presuppose a nail in particular, but, qua hammer, it does presuppose 
something that needs to be met with a specific kind of force, and, if the 
intention is not to break the object, then it presupposes something that 
can withstand the sort of force that can be exerted with a hammer. 
Certainly, if I say I urgently need a hammer, you can infer that the 
immediate task before me, i.e., the task for which I am intending to use 
it, is not to write a book, cut the hedge, clean the window, and so forth. 
Your question gets at an important point. There is no isomorphism 
between ontological claims and either method or substantive theory. It 
is important to be clear—I do try to be. Thus I argue the sorts of 
formalistic methods that mainstream economists insist upon 
presuppose the occurrence of event regularities. But the latter is a kind 
of reality; I am not too specific. Regularities can be actual or fictitious, 
stochastic or deterministic, and so on. In addition, when I argue that 
economists tend to construct theories in terms of isolated systems of 
atoms, I usually insist that, although this conception tends to be 
                                                 
1 Though see chapters 2, 4, and 5, of my Reorienting economics (Lawson 2003). 
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adopted as one that guarantees an event regularity formulation, it is not 
a necessary condition. An event regularity could come about purely by 
chance, underpinned by a different causal mechanism on each occasion. 
Of course, the latter is unlikely and economists do hope to be more 
systematic in their theorising. But whilst a construction in terms of 
isolated systems of atoms is only sufficient, not necessary, to guarantee 
an event regularity, I do observe that a posteriori this is how economists 
mostly, in fact, proceed. 
 
You often stress that your argument is an ontological one. However, 
you have also emphasised the importance of explanation as an 
epistemic goal in economics (Lawson 2003, chapter 4). Can you 
elaborate on the implications that ontology has for explanatory goals 
in economics? 
 
Ontology per se cannot be expected to provide any necessary 
implications in terms of a precise explanatory procedure. But it can 
provide insight. For example, the ontological conception I defend finds 
that reality, natural and social, is structured: there are different 
ontological levels. It follows that the phenomena at any one level may be 
caused by, and so warrant explanation in terms of, phenomena lying at a 
deeper level. Certainly, it cautions against assuming a priori that all 
causes lie at the surface, that events are caused only by other events. 
But what exactly is the case in any context requires investigation. An 
orientation, though, is indicated. Ontological results point to the sorts 
of conditions that methods must be designed to be consistent with. I 
have argued many times, for example, that methods that presuppose 
closed systems are unlikely to be generally useful for helping 
economists understand open systems. 
Having said all that, I have spent some time elaborating a dialectical 
approach that can be called contrast explanation, or, as I prefer, the 
method of explaining critical contrasts. Why? I have done so, in part at 
least, as a strategic move. An initial response to my setting out the 
ontological conception I defend was the suggestion that, because reality 
is portrayed as so complex, all method is limited and must knowingly 
distort. Therefore, it was frequently concluded, mathematical modelling 
in economics is no less relevant than any other approach. Of course it 
does not follow that just because reality is complex our analyses of it 
must knowingly distort. But in emphasising this I felt that the onus was 
on me to indicate examples of explanatory method that does not 
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knowingly distort under the conditions in which we live, or as described 
by the ontological conception I defend, and to give some illustrations. 
This I have done using the method in question (see, for example, Lawson 
2009a). As it happens I have found that this dialectical approach, if 
abstractly formulated, seems to encompass most other explanatory 
procedures as special cases. But that is a discovery, not a requirement. 
So I have engaged in explanatory illustration. But I have always 
emphasised that it is merely illustration. Of course that has not 
prevented some critics from mistakenly, and perhaps wilfully, 
interpreting me otherwise. 
 
Many economists claim to be interested only in the predictive success 
of their theories and models, and not in establishing a ‘deeper level’ 
causal explanation. It seems that you are trying to re-direct 
economists away from prediction and towards epistemic activities 
they may not be interested in. Is this the case? 
 
Yes, well this is where the analysis of social reality leads me. It is not an 
a priori orientation that I adopt. It is not that I am somehow against 
prediction. I think that if forty years of econometrics has revealed 
anything of value to us it is that you cannot very often make successful 
predictions of the sort that economists seek. Despite the claims of some 
econometricians, most results they achieve are pretty useless. Anyone 
can run millions of regressions with a set of data and report a result 
that seems to pass all tests—though the fact that millions of regressions 
are run means that most of the conditions of the tests are violated. But 
even with such results we find that as soon as new data come along the 
previously reported results or models typically break-down. What I am 
saying is that no matter how interested in successful prediction some 
economists may be, this interest does not make it feasible. Even so, I 
believe that though we cannot obtain what so many economists clearly 
want, we can nevertheless often get what we need; at least this is so if 
ultimately the underlying goal is to provide insight of a sort that enables 
us to contribute to making the world a better place, which I suspect it 
ought to be. 
I have been concerned both to explain the predictive failure of 
economics and to come up with a conception that enables us to see 
exactly what we can achieve analytically. As it happens I find that we 
can achieve rather a lot, which ordinary people do every day anyway. 
Fundamentally I believe that we can make our own history. We can grasp 
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the structures of reality and we—the community at large—can 
intentionally transform them in part according to our own goals. The 
future is not predetermined. So as I say we can make our own history. 
My arguments have driven me to this conclusion, and it is a conclusion 
that I am happy with. What more do we need—other than wisdom, of 
course, to direct our history making? 
Actually, let me add that I believe the emphasis on prediction in a 
world that is clearly open, is ultimately an aberrant form of behaviour 
that itself requires an explanation, probably a psychological one. In fact 
I am quite susceptible to the suggestion that, in many cases, the over-
concern with prediction is something of a coping mechanism resulting 
from earlier traumas in life. But that is another story. 
 
On several occasions you are warning against an ‘epistemic fallacy’ in 
methodological debates in economics by which you mean “the view 
that questions about being can always be reduced to questions about 
our knowledge (of being), that matters of ontology can always be 
translated into epistemological terms” (Lawson 2003, 111). How 
would you respond to an argument that your focus on ontology, 
might fall victim to committing an ‘ontological fallacy’, i.e., that it 
tends to reduce questions of epistemology to questions of ontology? 
 
Well, I hope not. This takes us back to your question about the hammer. 
Both reductions are to be avoided. It is in order to reduce the risk of the 
ontological fallacy that I often go on and on about the importance of not 
interpreting substantive theories or methods as critical realist ones (see, 
for example, Fullbrook 2009, chapter 4). Any two individuals starting 
from a shared ontological conception can end up with a different theory 
of phenomenon X or find themselves investigating it in different ways. 
Also substantive theories held as true at a moment in time can be 
revised in due course, with new experiences, without necessarily 
revising the ontological conception informing the analysis. All such 
possibilities depend on avoiding the ontological fallacy. 
 
An important conceptual distinction in your account of ontology is the 
one between “philosophical ontology” on the one hand and “scientific 
ontology” on the other (Lawson 2004). Can you elaborate on this 
distinction? 
 
Yes, though it should be noted that I do revise these concepts all of the 
time. But briefly, I have tended to use the category philosophical 
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ontology to refer to the practice of seeking to uncover shared properties 
of phenomena of a given domain, whilst I use the category scientific 
ontology to explore the specifics of a phenomenon in a domain. Thus if 
we focus on the social domain, under the heading of philosophical 
ontology, I have tended to argue that social phenomena are, for 
example, all produced, reproduced, or transformed through practice, 
and are inherently relational, structured, emergent, and meaningful, etc. 
Under the heading of scientific ontology I have explored the 
differentiating features of money, gender, institutions, technology, and 
so forth. 
 
Philosophical ontology is an enterprise that many philosophers of 
science reject. How do you see it as a justifiable enterprise? 
 
It is not just philosophical ontology that gets rejected. Pretty much any 
form of social ontology is rejected by many. And there is a strand of 
twentieth-century philosophy, inspired by Kant, and associated with the 
likes of Carnap, Putnam, and Strawson, that goes further. This strand 
conceives all ontology as properly concerned not with any external 
world in itself but only with human concepts, languages, or systems of 
beliefs. According to defenders of this position, the most that can be 
undertaken is a study of the presuppositions, or ontological 
commitments, of specific theories or systems of belief, an activity 
termed ‘internal metaphysics’. 
But I guess you are thinking of the later Quine, or those perhaps 
influenced by him, who are prepared to accept certain theoretical claims 
as reliable and so commit to the reliability of the posited ontology as 
well. However, such reliability is attributed only to some very special 
forms of reasoning, and in effect is confined to parts of natural science. 
The presumption here is that it is only our best natural scientific 
theories that are successful in providing insight. And because these 
theories are about specific causal mechanisms and the like the insight 
provided relates only to the subject matter of what I am calling (natural) 
scientific ontology. 
If we are forced to start from substantive theories regarded as 
reliable, then Quine and the others seem to be right. Certainly, the 
substantive theories of social science are mostly contested. And in the 
case of economics they are mostly simply irrelevant. However, in 
seeking reliable, and recognised-as-reliable, entry points we are not 
constrained to consider, with Quine, merely the content of theories. We 
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can, for example, just as legitimately commence from any feature of 
experience regarded as adequate to the relevant domain of reality, 
including those concerning human practices. I myself have certainly 
used every day and scientific practices as entry points for ontological 
analyses. 
And if philosophical ontology aims, as it does, at generalised 
insights we can seek reliable conceptions of human practices and so 
forth that too are reasonably generalised. We can do this starting both 
with practices whose (generalised) conditions of possibility are the 
subject of (non-social) natural ontology, and equally with practices 
whose conditions of possibility are the subject of social ontology.  
This is a long story, set out for example in chapter 2 of Reorienting 
economics (Lawson 2003), or in a position paper downloadable from the 
Cambridge Social Ontology Group website (Lawson 2004). What I have 
just said, though, should indicate why, in contrast to many 
philosophers, I do indeed believe justified (non-dogmatic and non-
transcendent) philosophical ontology to be possible. Indeed, it is 
something I take myself to have been doing. 
 
In a recent article your position on the scope of ontology has been 
compared to that of Nancy Cartwright (Pratten 2007). Another recent 
article compares your realism to Uskali Mäki’s work (Hodge 2008). 
What common ground and divergences do you see between your 
position and those held by Cartwright and Mäki? 
 
I am certainly an admirer of the contributions of these two. We are all 
realists and we all—Mäki, Cartwright, and I—self-consciously present 
ourselves as such. The most obvious research-guiding commonality, 
perhaps, is that we do all look at the ontological presuppositions of 
economics or economists. Cartwright has questioned what the world 
would be like for econometrics to work, and Mäki has looked into the 
presuppositions of Austrian economists amongst numerous others. I 
have looked at mainstream modelling, Keynes, Veblen, and Hayek and 
others in this regard. So, yes, a common ground is an interest in 
examining ontological presuppositions. 
Where we part company, I believe, is that I want to go much further. 
I guess I would see their work as primarily analytical and my own as 
more critically constructive or dialectical. My goal is less the clarification 
of what economists are doing and presupposing as seeking to change 
the orientation of modern economics. Or perhaps I am just more overt 
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in the latter. So I come across as far more critical. Indeed I am. 
Specifically, I have been much more prepared than the other two to 
criticise the ontological presuppositions of economists—at least 
publically. I think Mäki is probably the most guarded. I think too he is 
the least critical, at least of the state of modern economics. Cartwright 
can be critical. I find her to be more forthcoming in presentations than 
when she comes to writing things up for publication. Probably most 
people are, myself included. But the difference between Cartwright’s 
presentational and written styles seems more significant. Maybe this is a 
sensible strategy. 
As you have noted, a central part of my work is philosophical and 
scientific social ontology. This of course relates to what I have just said. 
My goal is to reorient social theory. I seek to develop an explicit account 
of the nature of social reality. The other two do not seem to go there too 
much. I do not think they put forward theories of the constitution of 
society—or at least not very often. On these issues, I think that my own 
stuff connects more closely with that of the likes of John Searle. But 
where there are overlaps of concerns in the contributions of myself, 
Mäki, and Cartwright, I am not sure there is that much difference in the 
sorts of positions taken. 
One feature of Mäki’s work that I am not overly convinced by, but 
which he seems to value, is his method of theoretical isolation (Mäki 
1992). If he is advocating it as a method for social scientific research, I 
doubt it will be found to have much relevance—for reasons I discuss in 
Economics and reality (Lawson 1997). But if he is just saying that the 
most charitable way of interpreting mainstream economists is that they 
are acting on this method, then fine. Sometimes, though, he seems to 
imply more. Otherwise there is not too much to divide us, I think, in 
terms of results. 
The big differences are our goals and orientations. But these of 
course do shape the scope and nature of the projects pursued. For 
example, I cannot get enthused by Mäki’s concern to see what can be 
justified in contemporary formalistic modelling endeavours. The 
insights, where they exist, seem so obvious, circumscribed, and tagged 
on anyway. So our actual contributions do end up being very different, 
which is probably good. I for one, though, would be happy if there was 
more communication between us all, though somehow I doubt it will 
happen. 
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One apparent difference between you and Mäki regarding ontology is 
the distinction between ‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’ approaches to 
ontological theorising. Mäki regards his own approach as the former 
and there is evidence to suggest that he would likely describe yours as 
the latter (Mäki 2005; Hands 2001). Do you agree? How do you see 
your approach? 
 
I do think Mäki gets this very wrong. He places in opposition what he 
calls ‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’ approaches—the former developing 
philosophical insight by starting from concrete economic analyses, the 
latter imposing onto economics philosophical injunctions determined 
outside of economics—and, as you note, he associates the former with 
himself and the latter with me. He is wrong, and possibly mischievous, 
in the way he characterises me, and I think it is misleading, or 
unhelpful, to present the options in such a dichotomous fashion. 
As I view things, anyway, a real difference between Mäki and me is 
that he is far less, or less openly, critical of the state and practices of 
modern economics, as I noted just now. And this bears on our research 
strategies. In seeking to draw philosophical insight from modern 
economics Mäki seems more inclined to accept mainstream economic 
contributions as largely successful, or anyway uncritically. I certainly do 
not think we can accept mainstream contributions as successful, and so 
I proceed somewhat differently. 
In my own stuff, as I earlier touched on when discussing the 
possibility of social ontology, I have preferred to start out from the 
everyday practices of lay people. These include, for example, those 
practices in which lay people negotiate: markets, institutions, and ever 
present social relations. These practices, I believe, are (and are 
recognised as being) reasonably successful. Thus I have questioned what 
is presupposed by the widespread everyday practices of all of us, what 
the social world must be like given them.2 
So if there is a difference here it is that Mäki more often starts out 
from mainstream academic economic analyses accepted rather 
uncritically, whilst I prefer to start from those everyday practices widely 
regarded as successful. It seems to me, though, that the two approaches 
are equally ‘bottom-up’, just different. 
But, as I say, I also think the dichotomy of ‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-
down’ is not too helpful. There is no harm, and often great value, in 
                                                 
2 See, especially, chapter 2 of Reorienting economics (Lawson 2003). 
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examining the contributions of other disciplines, which I also do. Nor 
must borrowing or abducting insights from one field to another be 
harmful or misleading. Problems only arise if the results of one 
discipline are imposed onto a second discipline. If instead the question 
is posed: does this insight from that field, say philosophy or biology or 
wherever, have any relevance to economics, then, as long as the theorist 
is prepared, if appropriate, to modify any such insight to meet the 
conditions of the target domain, I do not see the problem. Is it such a 
problem to examine whether it is possible that the study of Darwinian 
evolutionary processes can yield insights for social analysis? As it 
happens my own answer to this latter question is given in Reorienting 
economics (Lawson 2003, chapters 5, and 10). And is it necessarily 
problematic to ask similar questions concerning whether insights from 
the philosophy of natural science have relevance for the successful 
development of social science? 
So the distinction that Mäki draws between his approach and mine is 
not right; nor do I believe it is especially helpful. I am pleased you asked 
the question. It gives me the opportunity to express a view on the 
matter in this forum where Mäki is clearly influential. Perhaps Mäki will 
think I misrepresent him in turn. I hope I do not. But if so I hope he 
replies. 
 
Judging from your work, and also from what you have been saying so 
far, it is very clear that you reject mainstream economics. Is this a 
wholesale rejection or are there elements that you think should be 
retained? 
 
It is a wholesale rejection. Yes! But let me quickly elaborate. What I take 
to be essential to mainstream economics is the insistence that methods 
of mathematical modelling be everywhere and always employed in 
economic analysis. I emphasise the word ‘insistence’. It is this insistence 
that I reject wholesale. I do not, of course, oppose economists using or 
experimenting with mathematical methods, though I am pessimistic 
about the likelihood of much insight being so gained. But I am opposed 
to the insistence that we must all use these, and only these, methods, 
that the use of these methods constitutes proper economics, that 
employment and promotion be restricted to those who use only 
mathematical models, that only modelling methods be taught to 
students, and so on. This though is unfortunately the current state of 
economics. The mainstream dominates. 
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Let me add that I am of course very happy for advocates of the 
mainstream insistence on mathematical method to defend their case. But 
currently the method is imposed without argument and in the face of 
repeated explanatory failure. So yes, if I can emphasise that by the 
mainstream I mean the insistence on methods of mathematical 
modelling, mine is a wholesale rejection of this mainstream. 
 
One of your main arguments against mainstream economics is that 
deductive-mathematical models do not accurately represent the 
targeted social phenomena of interest (Lawson 1997, chapters 2, 8; 
Lawson 2003, chapter 1). In a broader context this argument seems 
related to the long-lasting debate in economic methodology about the 
realism of assumptions of theories and models, originating from 
Friedman’s famous essay (Friedman 1953). Can you discuss your 
position in this debate? 
 
Okay, let me elaborate my position in a series of steps. 
First, a starting point of my position is the widely recognised long 
history of failure of mathematical-deductivist modelling in economics. 
These methods presuppose event regularities or correlations. It has 
been found that these sorts of regularities rarely occur in the social 
realm. 
Second, an additional starting point is that mathematical models are 
typically found to be formulated in ways that are acknowledged, even by 
their formulators, as being wildly unrealistic.  
Third, mathematical economists, many of whom seem endlessly 
optimistic that success will eventually be achieved, persevere with their 
modelling endeavours and so seek theories that are consistent with, that 
guarantee, event regularity formulations. The way this is typically 
achieved is by their implicitly constructing theories in terms of isolated 
atoms. By atoms I do not mean something small. I mean factors that 
have the same effect, if triggered, whatever the context. It is this 
assumption of atomism that guarantees that if the factor is triggered—
this triggering is the first event—the same outcome, the second event, 
always follows, so long as nothing interferes. It is the assumption of 
system isolation that guarantees that nothing does interfere. 
Fourth, I defend a conception of social reality—a social ontology—as 
an emergent realm that is: highly interrelated, with each phenomenon 
being constituted in relation to everything else; intrinsically dynamic or 
processual, being continually reproduced or transformed through 
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practice; structured; and characterised by meaning, values, and much 
else. 
Fifth, the failures and lack of realisticness of many economic 
contributions that constitute my starting points are easily explained if 
the ontological conception I defend is at all correct. For social reality is 
found not to comprise parts that are isolated, for more or less 
everything seems to be constituted in relation to other things. And 
components cannot be treated as atomistic or stable, for each is being 
continually transformed. 
Hence, in producing theories couched in terms of isolated atoms 
that are quite at odds with social reality, modellers are actually 
compelled to make substantive claims that are wildly unrealistic. And 
because social reality does not conform to systems of isolated atoms, 
there is no guarantee that event regularities of the sort pursued will 
occur. Indeed, they are found not to. This is a long story set out, for 
example, in Reorienting economics (Lawson 2003, chapter 1). But the 
above contains the gist of my critique of the modern mainstream 
insistence on methods of mathematical modelling. 
Now, sixth, Friedman enters this scene arguing that all we need to do 
is predict successfully, that this can be done even without realistic 
theories, and that unrealistic theories are to be preferred to realistic 
ones, essentially because they can usually be more parsimonious. 
The first thing to note about this response is that Friedman is 
attempting to turn inevitable failure into a virtue. In the context of 
economic modelling, the need to produce formulations in terms of 
systems of isolated atoms, where these are not characteristic of social 
reality, means that unrealistic formulations are more or less 
unavoidable. Arguing that they are to be preferred to realistic ones in 
this context belies the fact that there is not a choice. 
What amazed me about the initial responses to Friedman by 
numerous philosophers and others is that they mostly took the form: 
prediction is not enough, we need explanation too. Rarely, if ever, was it 
pointed out that because the social world is open, we cannot have 
successful prediction anyway. 
So my own response to Friedman’s intervention is that it was mostly 
an irrelevancy, but one that has been opportunistically grasped by some 
as a supposed defence of the profusion of unrealistic assumptions in 
economics. This would work if successful prediction were possible. But 
usually it is not. 
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Strangely enough, perhaps, if we could have successful prediction I 
might be inclined to side with Friedman. If spontaneous event 
regularities were ubiquitous, then we could indeed use them for 
predictive purposes irrespective of the theory of underlying causal 
mechanisms associated with them. And if they were spontaneous and 
ubiquitous we might not be able to identify underlying causes anyway. It 
is our ability to manipulate the latter, or the failure of supposed certain 
regularities, which is often essential to uncovering underlying causes. 
Anyway, I think I have said enough on this. Friedman’s intervention 
was based on the error of supposing we can predict successfully, and is 
now often opportunistically referred to as a supposed justification for 
unrealistic models in a context in which realistic models are not a viable 
option and successful prediction is not achieved either. 
Incidentally, Friedman’s position is often advanced as an alternative 
to realism. That is just a mistake. Friedman is a realist about events and 
models, and even causal mechanisms. He has to be to assess, as he does, 
that certain formulations of them can be unrealistic. Only a realist can 
coherently claim to be, or that others are, wrong, or unrealistic, or right, 
or realistic, etc. It never was a realist versus non-realist debate. Every 
position is realist. I do not know anyone in economics who is not a 
realist. Some of us, though, are explicit about it. That is a major 
difference. 
 
What about Deirdre McCloskey? 
 
McCloskey is a realist about rhetoric! She is a realist about the economic 
profession. She is a realist about econometrics… Realism is inescapable! 
The question is always not whether someone is a realist, but what form 
that person’s realism takes. 
 
Contrary to your rejection of mainstream economics you seem to hold 
a quite favourable stance towards heterodox economics in general. 
Can you be specific? Which branches of heterodox economics do you 
regard as particularly promising and how do you see the role of your 
ontological account in relation to the various heterodox schools of 
thought? 
 
I can be critical about everyone. But I think my dominant orientation, 
and natural inclination is to be inclusive in all walks in life. I am very 
critical of the mainstream because it is exclusive. It insists that only 
people doing just mathematical modelling should be admitted to the 
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economics academy. As you know, my background is mathematics, I can 
do the maths. So I do not feel excluded in principle even by them; I just 
do not like them to exclude everyone who does not want to do maths. 
So yes, most of my arguments directed towards heterodox 
economics are concerned with identifying commonalities. I think the 
heterodox groups implicitly share an ontological conception broadly 
along the lines I outlined a few minutes ago. These groups are 
differentiated from each other in focusing on different aspects. So I see 
them basically as divisions of labour in the same overall project, which I 
truly think we are. 
I feel positive about aspects of most of the traditional heterodox 
groups. This is especially true of feminist economics, but also of old 
institutionalism, post Keynesianism, Marxian economics, and even 
Austrian economics—which seems to surprise and dismay some people. 
In recent years, I have probably taken most from the feminists. 
But I can certainly be critical even in the context of the traditional 
heterodox groupings. I mean, we find all sorts of funny things going on 
at heterodox economics conferences. There are people there who still 
think that theorems are the most important thing. They are just more 
tolerant than the mainstream in the sense that they do not try to make 
everyone else do theorems. Others think that econometrics is necessary 
to applied work. Most strangely, perhaps, there are those that seem to 
think that a switch from linear to non-linear forms of mathematical 
modelling represents some kind of advance in terms of realisticness. 
Worst of all, there are those, overlapping with some of those already 
mentioned, who apparently believe that, so long as conclusions already 
thought to be correct are reached, it does not matter what methods or 
assumptions are employed. And there are post-modernists who think we 
cannot say anything much about anything. I can be critical, but I put the 
emphasis more on unification and commonality. 
Probably the feature of the heterodox traditions of which I feel the 
most critical is a lack of willingness on the part of some to 
fundamentally question the founding contributors. People identify 
themselves with a certain tradition and are very resistant to anything 
that challenges views that they associate with their figureheads. 
Relatedly, there can be too much arguing from the authority of the 
figureheads. Any is too much. And, perhaps even worse, there is quite a 
lot of trying to pretend that all recent insights, including ontological 
ones, were first formulated by these founders, when it is often very 
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obvious that such is not the case. Probably the worst of these latter 
tendencies are manifest in the contributions of some of those who 
associate with Keynes or Veblen. 
 
What impact do you think critical realism has had so far on 
economics, mainstream or heterodox, and on philosophical issues 
pertaining to the discipline? 
 
I do not know. I am not sure it is for me to say. Perhaps let me make one 
claim. I think that it has contributed significantly to the fact that 
ontology is now explicitly a part of the ongoing conversation. It is not 
really apparent in the mainstream discourse, but it is pretty much 
evident everywhere else in economics. This is so even amongst those 
methodologists who seem reluctant to criticise mainstream economics 
and seemingly have little interest in heterodox economics or in changing 
the state of modern economics. It is true even of those methodologists, 
mostly a subset of the latter, who apparently feel uneasy about critical 
realism, including those who like to pretend to themselves, or to the 
world, that it is not really there. 
In Edward Fullbrook’s introduction to his recent book (Fullbrook 
2009) he points out how, at least up to the mid-1990s, the term 
‘ontology’ almost never figured in economic methodology, or indeed 
anywhere else in economics. Now that has all changed. And I think those 
contributing to critical realism can take a good deal of the credit for 
this—or blame, if you feel negative about the situation. 
 
In your view, what role does or should economics play in society? 
Maybe you can also discuss the role of economics, as you see it, in the 
current financial crisis? 
 
My views on all this are long and complex. In brief, I think the goal of 
economics, and indeed social sciences more widely, should be to 
uncover or identify the conditions that get in the way of a society based 
on generalised human flourishing. Of course we are all different and 
everything changes, so this is a complex story. It requires lots of 
ontology. 
The role that economics has in fact played in the current crisis, 
certainly academic economics, is basically a passive but negative one. By 
getting on with their mathematical modelling activities, as they do, 
economists are mostly being irrelevant, but are diverting resources that 
could be used to provide insight. And worse still, irrelevant 
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mathematical models of the sort economists produce, have been used 
by investment bankers and other speculators and, perhaps most 
worryingly of all, by rating agencies. But this is a long story. I have set 
out some of my views on this in a paper that appears in the Cambridge 
Journal of Economics (Lawson 2009b). 
 
Earlier in our discussion of Cartwright and Mäki you expressed a wish 
for more dialogue. Indeed, it seems to be the case that there is 
relatively little contact between critical realists and other economic 
methodologists who, one might argue, hold similar positions. Why do 
you think this is so? 
 
I do not know if what you say is entirely true. I mean there are different 
forms of contact. For example, we have this workshop in Cambridge and 
almost everybody I can think of in economic methodology has been 
invited, and most have turned up.  
Speaking personally, it is true that, because my engagement with 
methodology is in large part motivated to change things, I perhaps share 
more with heterodox economists interested in methodology than with 
the economic methodologists who do methodology more for its own 
sake. I think I am quite active in heterodox circles. But I am happy to 
engage with anyone. 
As a rather boring practical matter, it is the case that I get very little 
money for travel. Mostly I go where people invite me and throw in the 
travel costs. I thus interact with whoever invites me. This also means I 
miss most of the big conferences. But at this moment it does mean that 
I am able to interact with you lot here at Rotterdam. I am sorry Mäki has 
moved on to Helsinki. 
Of course, I interact with everyone in publications. See for example 
Edward Fullbrook’s (2009) latest volume, or past issues of Journal of 
Economic Methodology (2004, vol. 11, issue 3), Feminist Economics (2003, 
vol. 9, issue 1), Review of Social Economy (1998, vol. 56, issue 3), 
Economia (1997, vol. 1, issue 2), or the volume by Fleetwood (1999), and 
such like. Indeed, I think I probably engage in written debate with other 
methodologists as much as anyone. Am I so wrong in thinking that? 
 
Perhaps the previous question was somewhat lacking in precision. Let 
me try again. It seems that there is, potentially, considerable common 
ground between your work on ontology in economics on the one hand 
and work on social ontology by philosophers such as Margaret 
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Gilbert, John Searle, and Raimo Tuomela on the other. You briefly 
mentioned Searle a few moments ago but in your published work 
there seems to be little interaction with these authors. Do you think 
there is a conflict between this work on social ontology and your 
ontological account? 
 
It is certainly the case that I do not have much contact with academic 
philosophers, less perhaps than I should. This is mainly because I find 
them, by and large, to be overly analytical, more concerned with being 
thought to be clever than with addressing matters about the way the 
world is, which is my interest. By and large I find the best philosophy, or 
anyway that which connects most with my own interests, is done 
outside philosophy departments. But John Searle is fundamentally 
interested in the way the world is, as are the others you mention. 
Indeed, Searle’s work on the constitution of society is ignored by many 
philosophers precisely because it is insufficiently like their conception 
of proper analytic philosophy. Searle’s contributions, I think, like those 
of critical realism, are much more influential amongst natural and social 
scientists than amongst philosophers. 
Actually, I did take up an invitation to visit Searle and his ontology 
group in Berkeley last summer, for about five weeks. In fact I went twice, 
because I was also earlier invited by Searle to give a talk at his bi-annual 
Collective Intentionality Conference, which incidentally also featured 
Tuomela and Gilbert. It was a very fruitful experience for me. No, I do 
not see a big conflict in our projects, certainly not between mine and 
Searle’s. Searle actually thinks that we agree on just about everything. I 
am not so sure, but he well may be right. Certainly we agree on rather a 
lot. And we are very, very similar in our mentalities and orientation. 
Searle is very ready to speak or write his mind on anything, to say things 
as he sees them, no matter what the consequences in terms of 
unpopularity within his own discipline. I think I try to do the same. 
In terms of our projects we spent a lot of time comparing notes. In 
fact, I led a seminar contrasting the two projects. The chief difference 
between us, I believe, is not the positions we sustain, but how we get 
there. Searle has kind of built on his theorising of language, the mind, 
and so forth. At all stages he has been concerned that his theories are 
consistent with our best conceptions in the natural sciences. The latter 
have acted as an explicit control on his thinking. In contrast, I have 
tended to start from conceptions of generalised social practices, and 
asked what the social world must be like for them to occur. But as I say, 
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the results we reach turn out to be very similar. The categories used are 
sometimes different, and we present our results differently. We may 
differ on issues like emergence; I appear to defend a stronger form than 
Searle does. But actually even here the difference seems mostly to 
disappear once we unpack some of the terminology. So no, I do not 
think there is any significant conflict. None anyway that seems 
irreconcilable. We actually discussed the idea of joint work when we 
met. But I doubt we will ever find the time or opportunity to fit it in. 
 
You already mentioned the Cambridge Social Ontology Group. The 
group has been going strong for years now. Can you describe what it 
is and how it came about? 
 
Yes! First though it is important to distinguish the Ontology Group from 
the Realist Workshop. Many conflate the two. The latter is a weekly 
Monday night seminar, open to all. It started twenty years ago with a 
group of PhD students, each working with me on philosophical issues, 
who wanted to meet with each other and discuss philosophical matters. 
We met one Monday night. The session was successful, so at the end of 
the night we arranged to meet the following Monday. That led to us 
meeting again on the Monday following that one. And we are still going 
twenty years later. That is the Realist Workshop. 
When we started out the Realist Workshop it was a very informal, 
organically developing sort of endeavour. Those who came kind of grew 
up together and helped each other in their research, and so forth. After 
about ten years or so the Realist Workshop had changed. It was still 
meeting on Monday nights, but it was no longer this organic group we 
started with where we read each others’ papers. Many of the original 
attendees had left Cambridge to gain academic employment. And the 
emphasis had become less personal. It had become more another type 
of performance. 
People come from around the world, famous people are coming in 
and give their talks, Nobel Memorial Prize winners like Amartya Sen or 
whoever. Each talk, though, is understandably usually unconnected with 
that of the previous week, and the audience can vary from week to week 
as well. It has remained a wonderful intellectual event. But en route we 
lost that organic character we had in the beginning. We lost the idea of 
developing our ideas together as a group. 
That is why about ten years ago I set up the Ontology Group. It is a 
smaller group—of about fifteen people. The idea is that the same people 
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show up each time, and there is continuity in the discussion from 
meeting to meeting. What we do there is basically discuss topics in 
ontology. The structure is variable. A topic can last for an hour, or for a 
term and more. We spent about a term discussing the nature of gender, 
even longer discussing the nature of rules. We have even discussed the 
nature of econometrics. As I say people are expected to come to each 
meeting and the discussion progresses. That is the point of the 
Ontology Group. 
Now the Realist Workshop and the Ontology Group are both oriented 
more to questions than to answers, though we seek answers. In the 
Ontology Group in particular we explore limitations of our shared 
beliefs. Sometimes it almost feels like a confessional. We question and 
re-question everything, not least the things we defend quite strongly in 
public. And we do laugh a lot. We continually criticise ourselves. We also 
go round and round in dialectical circles, trying to make sure that 
everything is coherent with everything else, following every criticism 
and change in understanding—though we rarely succeed. No one feels 
the need to be protective about anything. Everyone’s ego is left outside 
the room. It is very enjoyable and rewarding. The meetings are 
supposed to last two hours but usually they go on longer. When we are 
really keen or excited we fit in additional meetings at night times in 
pubs, or we may meet over vacations. As I say it is basically an ontology 
talk shop. But everyone involved seems to get a lot out of it. 
 
Finally, how do you see the future development of critical realism? 
Where do you think it is headed? Perhaps you can also tell us a bit 
about your own research plans? 
 
I do not know about the future of critical realism. Throughout the 
disciplines it is quite healthy. It has become a big movement now. Once 
a year there is the conference of the International Association for 
Critical Realism, an organisation I effectively set up about ten years ago, 
and all the disciplines are there: sociology, politics, anthropology, all the 
natural sciences, and all the arts too, and the humanities. Everyone is 
there. It is doing well. 
But I do not know what the future holds. There is clearly an awful lot 
of ontological work still to be done—of course, there always will be. And 
critical realism is branching out in different directions. There might 
come a point where the label has outlived its usefulness. As I think I 
mentioned earlier, there are people who call themselves this or that sort 
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of critical realist. There are all sorts of turns and there are people within 
critical realism who do not like this turn or that turn or another turn. So, 
it is much more heterogeneous than it may seem to be. The future is 
open. Who knows where it will all lead?  
As for myself, I am working on questions like: what is the nature of 
money? What is the nature of this? What is the nature of that? I am also 
working on a theory of society that extends, but in some significant 
ways is quite different from, my earlier account. It is slightly more 
substantive, and in some ways more naturalistic, than what I have done 
before, and I do not know whether other critical realists will find it 
appealing. But that is something for the future. 
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